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TRADE AND LABOUR STANDARDS: 
A REVIEW OF THE ISSUES 
I. Introduction 
This is a paper by a labour economist for trade specialists. It is written at 
a time of hope tempered by fear. On the trade side, the hope is that the new 
World Trade Organisation will stimulate a better trading environment for all 
countries. On the labour side, the hope is that labour standards can continually 
be improved for most if not all of the world's working people. But there are also 
fears. One fear is that these goals may be difficult to achieve simultaneously. 
Another is that they may be undone by various pressures, including issues left 
unresolved in the Uruguay Round of the GATT.' 
Trade and labour market policies are continuously being discussed and 
reformulated.2 Strangely enough, much of this debate takes place in the absence 
of clearly-articulated goals. The reasons, it would seem, are twofold. On the one 
hand, for some analysts, the goals (e.g. freer trade, workers' rights) are held to be 
self-evident. On the other hand, the goals are themselves sometimes hard to 
pinpoint. When does "free trade" give way to "fair trade"? When does the 
pursuit of one labour standard (e.g. free collective bargaining) take precedence 
over another (e.g. full employment)? 
Policy choices are best discussed in terms of explicit, workable goals and it 
is proposed to start with the following two: 
facilitating and expanding mutually beneficial trading opportunities; 
- enabling workers to achieve higher real earnings at the fullest possible 
level of employment while maintaining basic workplace rights (to be 
specified below). 
It should be remembered, though, that these are not primary economic 
objectives. They are, rather, means toward an objective pursued by many national 
and international development agencies: raising the material standards of living 
for the world's people. 
In the balance of this brief paper, five questions are raised for consideration: 
1. On what basis should labour standards be chosen? 
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2. Is there such a thing as basic labour rights? If so, should they be 
harmonized internationally? 
3. What labour standards are appropriate beyond the basic level and how 
might they be achieved? 
4. Based on countries' experiences, is it better to promote labour standards 
directly or indirectly? 
5. Are labour standards and international trade substitutes or complements? 
II. The basis for deciding on "appropriate" labour standards 
To begin with, two extreme positions on labour standards have to be 
rejected. One is "the more the better". The other is "the fewer the better". 
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has 174 conventions covering 
a wide range of labour standards including respect of fundamental human rights, 
protection of wages, employment security, working conditions, labour market and 
social policies, and industrial relations. The ILO devotes an important part of its 
efforts to having these conventions adopted and applied. In the words of the 
ILO's Director-General: 
"One of our major responsibilities, therefore, is to ensure that, once adopted, 
standards are widely ratified by States which solemnly pledge to apply them. 
We would be falling far short of our claim to universality if we were to 
insist on the universality of standards as a matter of principle without taking 
the same trouble to make sure that they were universally implemented."3 
The ILO itself recognises that it has not set priorities among the various 
conventions and recommendations, even though some may conflict with others.4 
The ILO approach takes for granted that, in the absence of such conventions, 
countries will not fulfil the goals toward which labour standards are directed. 
One might legitimately ask whether such targets as full employment and rising 
real earnings would come closer to being met in countries that consciously "push" 
labour standards up through legislative means or those that allow them to be 
"pulled" up by the forces of supply and demand in labour markets. This will be 
discussed in more detail later in this paper. 
To discuss the opposite position — that the fewer labour standards there are, 
the better — the following example could be used. A leading labour economics 
textbook5 written by two colleagues at Cornell University analyses some of the 
adverse consequences and unintended side-effects of well-intentioned labour 
market policies — indeed, it presents these so convincingly that many of the 
students come away with the impression that labour market policies usually do 
not work and that labour markets are best left alone. It is essential in the 
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classroom to stress the positive main-effects of a labour market regulation or 
institution and to point out that these may more than outweigh the negative side-
effects. There is no easy generalisation, and the "less is better" view is as 
imbalanced on one side as is the "more is better" view on the other. 
How, then, are we to decide which labour standards are appropriate? While 
it is argued by some6 that international labour standards are needed in order to 
prevent countries from competing with one another on the basis of "illegitimate 
advantages", a different basis for evaluation could be suggested, namely, basic 
human rights in the workplace. The distinguishing criterion one could propose 
is whether it is better to have no production at all than to have production using 
"illegitimate means ". 
If this criterion is adopted, it would imply that labour rights would be set at 
a minimum level appropriate to all working people in rich and poor countries 
alike and guaranteed by appropriate international agreements. They would be 
taken out of the realm of benefit-cost comparisons with tradeoffs among desirable 
goals and would instead be treated as inviolable rights. 
What are the basic human rights in the workplace for men, women, and 
children everywhere? Would it be desirable to go beyond these basic labour 
rights to other labour standards? 
III. Basic labour rights and harmonization of labour standards 
It is useful at the outset to distinguish between a "labour standard" and a 
"labour right"; a "labour standard" is something we would aim towards and rather 
have than not have, whereas a "labour right" is something that is not to be 
violated except under the most extreme circumstances. "Labour standards" thus 
include "labour rights" but go beyond them.7 
The US Department of Labour has repeatedly upheld the desirability of the 
following list of labour standards:8 
1. Freedom of association 
2. The right to organise and bargain collectively 
3. Prohibition on forced or compulsory labour 
4. A minimum age for the employment of children 
5. Guarantee of acceptable working conditions (possibly including 
maximum hours of work per week, a weekly rest period, limits to work 
by young persons, a minimum wage, minimum workplace safety and 
health standards, and elimination of employment discrimination). 
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Section 502 (b) (8) of the 1984 Trade and Tariff Act authorises the President to 
withhold recognition under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) to a 
country that "has not taken or is not taking steps to afford internationally 
recognised worker rights to workers in the country (including any designated zone 
in that country)."9 
The European Union's "Social Charter," approved by all of the EC Member 
countries except for the United Kingdom, specifies an even broader list of worker 
"rights" (which, because they are voluntary, might better be viewed as "targets"): 
Freedom of movement 
- The right to employment and remuneration 
The improvement of living and working conditions 
-- The right to social protection 
- The right to freedom of association and collective bargaining 
The right to vocational training 
- The right of men and women to equal treatment 
- The right of information, consultation, and participation 
- The right to health and safety in the workplace 
- The protection of children and adolescents in employment 
- The protection of elderly persons 
- The protection of persons with disabilities 
It is sad but true that standards like these are unattainable for most of the 
world's people. The reason is very basic: most of the world's economies are too 
poor to assure these standards for the majority of their people, and even in the 
rich countries, these standards are not guaranteed to everyone. For example, 
when rural parents in the developing countries must decide between employing 
their children on the family farm during planting and harvesting season or sending 
them to school, the children are often made to work long and hard, even though 
not going to school is known to have potentially negative effects on the children's 
future opportunities.10 Or to take another example of a clash of priorities, when 
people receive extremely low hourly earnings from wage jobs or self-employment, 
they will want to work very long work weeks in order to meet their basic 
subsistence needs; in these circumstances, it would be heartless to limit the work 
week or compel a weekly rest period. However, the preceding lists are too 
ambitious and unrealistic for the majority of the world's workers. 
Even leading labour officials now recognise the impossibility of guaranteeing 
"acceptable working conditions" at an internationally uniform level. For instance, 
the United States' Secretary of Labour, Robert Reich, said in a recent speech: 
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"It is inappropriate to dictate uniform levels of working hours, minimum 
wages, benefits, or health and safety standards. The developing countries' 
insistence that they must grow richer in order to afford American or 
European labour standards - and that they must trade if they are to grow 
richer — is essentially correct."" 
Along similar lines, the General Secretary of the International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), one of the strongest advocacy groups for labour, 
wrote: 
"The ICFTU-APRO does not think that is possible or desirable to set a 
world-wide minimum wage. Negotiations between employers, unions, and 
governments within countries, which take into account productivity and other 
factors, are the best way to ensure that as trade and development progress, 
wages and other conditions of work improve."12 
These statements suggest that a "guarantee of acceptable working conditions" has 
effectively been removed from current policy debate. 
In the spirit of aiming for something that is both attainable and enforceable 
in every country, a set of basic labour rights for workers throughout the world 
can be proposed: 
i) No person has the right to enslave another or to cause another to enter 
into indentured servitude, and every person has the right to freedom 
from such conditions.13 
ii) No person has the right to expose another to unsafe or unhealthy 
working conditions without the fullest possible information.14 
iii) Children have the right not to work long hours whenever their families' 
financial circumstances allow.15 
iv) Every person has the right to freedom of association in the workplace 
and the right to organise and bargain collectively with employers.16 
Such labour rights are essential for assuring fundamental human rights and that 
they should, therefore, be adopted around the world as soon as possible.17 
Viewed in this way, the question of whether this four-point programme should be 
harmonized internationally can be answered easily. Yes, it should be: basic 
labour rights should be "taken out of competition" and guaranteed everywhere 
precisely because these rights are basic to all people. 
IV. International pressure for additional labour standards 
Should international pressure be brought to bear in the pursuit of additional 
labour standards that go beyond the four basic labour rights just proposed? Here, 
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one would argue that such standards should not be harmonized under the aegis 
of international organisations even if "deep integration" were possible, which it 
probably is not.18 Labour standards should, rather, be left to the individual 
countries.19 The reasons for concluding this are several: 
1. Although developed countries' concerns for developing countries' labour 
standards are motivated in part by a humanitarian desire to improve the 
conditions of work in other countries, they nonetheless strike many in 
the developing world as unwarranted intrusion into their internal affairs 
and affronts to their national sovereignty. People in the developing 
world are offended when they are treated as being incapable of deciding 
what would be appropriate for themselves, and they rightly regard 
developed countries' advice as patronising. A remarkable unanimity of 
views against imposed international labour standards has been expressed 
by the leaders of developing countries around the world, including the 
Member states of the Association of South-East Asian Nations and the 
"Rio Group" of Latin American nations. 
2. To many in the Third World, the First World's call for labour standards 
is protectionism of a badly-disguised sort.20 Protestations about 
benevolent motives are regarded with considerable scepticism and, 
anyhow, motives are not observable. What is observable is that most 
of the support for labour standards comes from labour unions and labour 
ministries in some of the developed countries.21 Not surprisingly, the 
developing countries often react with anger. Consider this from the 
Prime Minister of Malaysia: 
"Western governments openly propose to eliminate the competitive 
edge of East Asia. The recent proposal for a world-wide minimum 
wage is a blatant example. Westerners know that this is the sole 
comparative advantage of the developing countries. All other 
comparative advantages (technology, capital, rich domestic markets, 
legal frameworks, management and marketing networks) are with 
the developed states. It is obvious that the professed concern about 
workers' welfare is motivated by selfish interest. Sanctimonious 
pronouncements on humanitarian, democratic and environmental 
issues are likely to be motivated by a similar selfish desire to put 
as many obstacles as possible in the way of anyone attempting to 
catch up and compete with the West."22 
3. International standards designed with one problem in mind may make 
little sense in other contexts. Take the widely-urged standard of 
prohibiting production by forced or convict-labour and banning the trade 
in such goods.23 This standard is motivated by abuses in countries 
which have been found to use political prisoners who are given only 
meagre subsistence and no wages to produce low-cost goods for export. 
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This is indeed outrageous. But would it be any less outrageous if the 
goods were sold only within those countries? Anyhow, most convicts 
around the world are imprisoned not for political reasons but because 
they have been convicted of crimes. To the extent that those who have 
committed violent or antisocial acts are made to work in prison for their 
living, why should not the goods they produce be sold abroad, with the 
proceeds to be used as partial compensation to the home societies (by, 
for example, defraying the social cost of maintaining prisons)? The 
case for banning the export of goods made by prison labour is 
unconvincing. 
It is unlikely that an enforcement mechanism can be found that would 
be acceptable to all sides, but let us suppose for the moment that one 
could be. For instance, one of the world's leading advocates for free 
trade, Professor Jagdish Bhagwati of Columbia University, has proposed 
that US labour laws be applied to subsidiaries of US firms producing in 
Mexico. Assuming that international labour standards could be enforced 
in this way, one can reasonably ask whether they should be. Would it 
be good to apply the US minimum wage to subsidiaries of US firms 
operating in Mexico, considering the likely adverse employment effects? 
Should the labour of Mexican children be outlawed even when families 
rely on that labour for their livelihoods? Would it be right to impose 
an eight-hour day or a forty-hour week on people who want to work 
longer? If Mexico were to agree to these standards, how many jobs 
would move to other countries where these standards are not imposed? 
How many non-US companies who would not have to meet US labour 
standards would move into Mexico and replace US companies which 
would have to meet those standards? It is not obvious what would be 
good for Mexico; that is not for us to decide, but for them. 
The European Union has set up structural funds which are supposed to 
help the less-developed countries and regions do what other Member 
states wish them to. Along similar lines, Ehrenberg has proposed 
compensating the developing countries for instituting and enforcing 
higher labour standards, but his is a lonely voice.24 
Finally, it is interesting to note that the ILO itself has opposed sanctions 
against countries that have failed to comply with conventions they have 
ratified or with the ILO's universal principles. Why? "In addition to 
implementing sanctions, the mere prospect of sanctions is capable of 
discouraging ratification, or even membership in the Organisation."25 
And: "[To] link trade concessions (such as access to their markets) to 
compliance with certain labour standards with a view to combating what 
they refer to as "social dumping" . . .[could cause our supervisory 
machinery to suffer] if the conclusions that result from it are used in a 
context of coercion."26 
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V. How to raise labour standards: push or pull? 
Assuming that it is left to individual countries to decide when and how to 
raise labour standards, what lessons might they find helpful from comparative 
analysis of other countries' experiences? First, it is necessary to be explicit about 
what is meant by "improved labour standards". Above, it was suggested that 
higher labour standards might be conceived as enabling workers to achieve higher 
real earnings at the fullest possible level of employment, and that is the objective 
that is taken here as given. 
Two broad approaches toward raising labour standards can be found: 
— Governments often take direct action aimed at raising labour standards: 
directly increasing employment, directly raising wages by means of 
government pay policy for the public sector and minimum wages for the 
private sector, encouraging and facilitating strong trade unions, 
instituting ambitious labour codes. 
- Labour standards are also promoted indirectly, via actions to accelerate 
economic growth so that improvements in wage and employment 
opportunities can be afforded.27 Among the developing countries, the 
direct approach of pushing up wages and employment has been the 
dominant one in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and South 
Asia; by contrast, some Far Eastern economies (Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Korea, and Taiwan) are noteworthy for their reliance on indirect 
methods and the virtual absence of direct ones.28 In the developed 
world, the European countries might appropriately be classified in an 
intermediate position. 
Setting labour standards directly is a tricky business. In modelling the 
effects on labour market outcomes of pushing up labour standards, due account 
must be taken of such predictable consequences as informalisation, partial 
coverage, and international movement of companies and jobs. Existing labour 
market models are not entirely satisfactory in this regard. 29 
Modern economic theory seeks to justify government intervention in the 
economy as a response to market failure, but the literature on the labour standards 
question has not gone very far toward specifying what market failure is being 
corrected. There are some apparent failures — asymmetric information on the 
health and safety risks associated with particular jobs (which motivates proposed 
basic labour standard number (ii) "No person has the right to expose another to 
unsafe or unhealthy working conditions without the fullest possible information.") 
and severe limits on international migration as a response to poor labour 
conditions — but discussion of these is conspicuously missing from the labour 
standards literature. On the other hand, one "failure" that is sometimes alleged 
in the literature is the failure of companies to do what is in their own interest, 
16 
leading some economists and other social scientists to argue that the imposition 
of labour standards could lead to improved industrial relations practices, more and 
better worker training, greater purchasing power of labour, and the like, all of 
which are presumed to be better for firms.30 This line of reasoning implicitly 
assumes that firms are not now maximising profits and furthermore that the 
deviations from profit-maximising behaviour in the absence of enforced labour 
standards are systematic — too little labour-management co-operation, for 
example. Neoclassically-oriented economists are not likely to be convinced by 
such claims, implicit or otherwise. 
A more convincing argument might be the following: there exist multiple 
equilibria, the world's economies have somehow got locked into an inferior one 
because of coordination failures, and the imposition of labour standards on a 
world-wide scale would cause a shift to a superior equilibrium. This would, 
however, have to be demonstrated to be applicable to current conditions. 
Consider now the alternative of waiting for labour standards to be pulled up 
by the forces of supply and demand. Have the indirect methods worked? 
Table 1 summarises the changes in labour market conditions for four East Asian 
economies. These data show two distinct phases, corresponding to the predictions 
of the famous dualistic development model of Lewis (1954) and Fei and Ranis 
(1964).31 In the first phase, when these economies were labour-abundant, real 
labour earnings stayed roughly constant while unemployment fell. In the second 
phase, once essentially-full employment was attained, real labour earnings rose 
rapidly while full or nearly-full employment was maintained.32 The results are 
astounding: in Taiwan, real wages are eight times higher than they were a 
generation ago, and in Korea, they are more than six times higher. 
The extent to which workers in the Far East shared in their economies' 
economic growth can be demonstrated in another way. As Table 2 shows, in all 
four economies in the 1980s, real labour earnings grew at least as fast as real per 
capita GNP. The four Far Eastern economies have had very low rates of 
unemployment and very low levels of income inequality by international 
standards.33 This means that people at the bottom end of the income distribution 
have benefited proportionately from economic growth, and in this way, growth 
raised labour standards: real minimum wages were increased, unemployment 
insurance systems were instituted, social protection systems were created, and 
collective bargaining grew in importance.34 
Recent cross-country analysis by the OECD (1994)35 yields a similar 
conclusion. In Figure 1, the total wage and non-wage benefits received by 
workers in various European countries are plotted against the countries' GDP's 
per capita (in $PPP). The remarkably tight positive relationship in the figure 
means that growth of national income leads to higher returns for labour — a 
pattern fully consistent with the time-series evidence for the Asian countries 
presented above. 
17 
Table 1. Real wages and unemployment rates in four newly-industrialising 
economies (NIEs) 
Year 
1948 
1960/61 
1965 
1970/71 
1975/76 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1966/67 
1971/72 
1976 
1980/81 
1986 
1990 
Hong Kong 
Index of real wages, 1948 
100 
105 
157 
167 
194 
253 
301 
405 
Korea 
Index of real earnings, 
n.a. 
100 
169 
n.a. 
306 
421 
660 
; = IOO 
1966=100 
Unemployment rate (%) 
n.a. 
1.7 
n.a 
4.4 
4.3 
3.7 
3.8 
1.7 
8.2 
6.2 
4.5 
3.9 
4.1 
3.8 
2.4 
1966 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1990 
Singapore 
Index of average real monthly income per 
worker, 1966=100 
100 
100 
120 
176 
216 
Taiwan 
Index of real manufacturing 
1954=100 
earnings, 
9.1 (1965) 
4.8 (1977) 
3.5 
4.1 
2.0 
1954 
1960 
1970 
1979 
1985 
1990 
not available. 
ioo 
102 
183 
400 
518 
810 
6.3 (1955) 
4.3 (1963) 
1.5 (1972) 
1.3 (1981) 
2.9 
1.7 
Source: Fields, G. S. (1994), "Urban Poverty in Asia", Asian Development Outlook 1994, 
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Table 2. Economic growth and earnings growth in four newly-industrialising 
economies between 1980 and 1990. 
Korea 
Taiwan 
Hong Kong 
Singapore 
Growth of real GNP or 
GDP per capita (%) 
+ 121.8 (a) 
+ 88.0 (a) 
+ 64.2 (b) 
+ 77.5 (b) 
Growth of real earnings 
(%) 
+ 115.8 (c) 
+ 102.7 (d) 
+ 60.0 (d) 
+ 79.8 (e) 
(a) GNP growth 
(b) GDP growth 
(c) Mining and manufacturing 
(d) Manufacturing 
(e) All Industries 
Source: Fields, G. S., "Changing Labour Market Conditions and Economic Development in 
Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan," World Bank Economic Review, forthcoming. 
These international data suggest that there may be an effective alternative to 
pushing up wages and other labour standards directly: promoting labour 
standards indirectly through measures that foster economic growth. This is a call 
not for inattention to basic labour rights, which have not always been fully 
honoured in the Far East.36 It is, rather, a call for careful analysis of which 
mechanisms would best promote improved labour standards in particular country 
contexts. 
VI. International trade and labour standards: substitutes or 
complements? 
The case for free trade is usually made in terms of the national interest. 
Countries, it is said, will gain from free trade. The celebrated Hicks-Kaldor 
compensation principle is ordinarily invoked: it is thought to be sufficient that the 
sum total of the gains from trade outweigh the total losses. 
This argument is subject to two real-world problems, one of which is 
well-recognised by trade economists and one not. The one that is well-
recognised is that the conditions for free trade to be welfare-improving might not 
hold in practice, and as a result, restricting trade can theoretically produce better 
results.37 But it is not addressed here. What is addressed is the compensation 
principle in the context of real-world labour markets and trade competition. 
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Figure 1. Measures of labour standards and economic development 
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It is not enough that compensation be possible in principle. What matters 
is whether compensation occurs in fact, because as a practical matter, it rarely 
does. When compensation is not paid, we should look at how people are actually 
affected. When a worker who has a relatively good job by his/her country's 
standards loses that job (or is threatened by the loss of it) and is forced to settle 
for a less-good job, take early retirement, or whatever, he or she suffers a very 
real loss.38 It is precisely the perception that "good jobs" are being lost to 
overseas competitors that causes workers in the developed countries to oppose 
freer trade. It is cruel to dismiss the complaints of affected workers on the 
grounds that the compensation could have taken place when everyone knows that 
it will not. 
Losing one's job would not be a problem if equally good jobs were abundant 
elsewhere in the economy - which actually was the case in the East Asian 
economies. But elsewhere, where the jobs available are bad ones ("McJobs", as 
they are now being called in the United States) or where no jobs are available at 
all (as in many European countries), the fears of those in good jobs cannot be 
dismissed. 
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This call for greater sensitivity to the concerns and fears of working people 
is not a call for trade protection. The evidence for the East Asian economies 
presented in Section V shows that growth of trade and improvements in labour 
standards can go together. 
The experiences of the Asian newly-industrialising economies offer several 
lessons: 
appropriate factor pricing of the type practised in those economies can 
lead not only to rapid economic growth but also to the fullest possible 
use of a country's workers, first through full employment and then 
through rising real wages; 
- under a policy of market wage determination, wages can rise among a 
fully-employed labour force as fast as GNP per capita, if not faster; 
labour earnings do not have to be suppressed in order for outward-
oriented economic growth to be rapid. In fact, we learn from Singapore 
that a policy of wage repression can be harmful, not only for labour 
standards but also for growth.39 
From other regions of the world, we can also learn a cautionary lesson. 
Primacy to labour standards, if premature, can preclude competitiveness in trade, 
which in turn affects labour in those countries adversely. It is for reasons such 
as these that countries in Europe, Latin America, Africa, and South Asia are in 
the process of reevaluating their labour market legislation and regulations and 
social protection systems. 
In conclusion it can be said that in order to raise people's material living 
standards, countries should seek economic growth, using trade and labour market 
policies as appropriate means to that end. Labour standards and international 
trade can be complementary. Such complementarities should be sought by 
countries and by companies and fostered by the international community. 40 
VII. Conclusions 
At the outset, five questions were raised. Here, briefly, are answers to each: 
1. Some labour standards are essential immediately for assuring fundamental 
human rights and others are desirable targets to be set once countries can 
afford them. The defining criterion for labour rights is that production 
would not be allowed unless they are satisfied. International agreement 
should be sought on these basic workplace rights. 
2. Basic labour rights for workers throughout the world include freedom from 
slavery and indentured servitude, the fullest possible information on safety 
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and health risks in the workplace, avoidance of undue child labour when 
families' financial circumstances permit, and freedom of association and the 
right to organise and bargain collectively. 
3. When labour standards beyond the minimum are set in individual countries, 
they should be set by the countries themselves on the basis of what they can 
afford. 
4. Those countries in the Far East that have relied on indirect methods of 
pulling wages and employment opportunities up through supply and demand 
have progressed much more rapidly than have countries in other parts of the 
world that have attempted to push labour standards up through minimum 
wages, government pay policy, support of trade unions, extensive labour 
codes, and the like. Other countries may wish to consider the indirect 
approach to raising labour standards. 
5. Within some range, international trade and labour standards may well be 
complements rather than substitutes. 
VIII. A final remark 
If we in the First World really and truly believe that all workers in the Third 
World should enjoy the same labour standards as workers in our countries do, and 
if we are in fact prepared to offer others the same opportunities as our people 
have, let us open our borders and let people everywhere seek the best available 
labour standards wherever in the world they may be found. Otherwise, let us 
exercise a bit more restraint in telling others what we think they should do. 
B. 
1. 
2. 
a) 
b) 
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Appendix" 
Worker Rights Standardsb 
I. Freedom of association 
A. Definition 
The right of association concerns relations between unions and 
governments and involves the right of workers and employers: 
— to establish and join organisations of their choosing without previous 
authorisation; 
— to draw up their own constitutions and rules, elect their representatives, 
and formulate their programmes; 
- to join in confederations and affiliate with international organisations; 
and 
- to be protected against dissolution or suspension by administrative 
authority. 
B. General principles 
1. Freedom of association applies to everyone except military and police. 
2. Unions should be independent of the government or ruling party. 
a) Source: Brown, D.K., Deardoff, A.V. and Stern, R.M. (1993),"International Labour Standards and Trade: 
A theoretical Analysis", Paper prepared for the Fairness Claims and Gains from Trade Project Meeting, 
University of Minnesota Law School, in July, adapted from Lyle, F. (1991), see b) below. 
b) As stated in Lyle, F. (1991), (p.20) "Worker Rights in US Policy", Foreign Labour Trends 91-54. 
US Department of Labour, Bureau of International Labour Affairs: Washington: "These are not intended 
to be legal definitions, nor to encompass the entire spectrum of internationally recognised worker rights. 
Rather, they represent general guidance intended merely to highlight the basic principles behind each of 
the five internationally recognised worker rights found in US trade law." 
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3. Restrictions on the right to strike are legitimate only for government 
service (civil servants engaged in the administration of the state) and 
essential services (only those services whose interruption would 
endanger worker or public safety and health). When denied, there 
should be an effective alternate process for mediation, arbitration, and 
settlement of grievances. 
4. Unions' civil liberties must be respected. 
5. Unions may form and join federations, confederations, and international 
confederations. 
II. The right to organise and bargain collectively 
A. Definition 
The right to organise and bargain collectively concerns relations between 
unions and employers and involves the right of workers: 
— to be represented in negotiating the prevention and settlement of 
disputes with employers; 
— to protection against interference with union activities; 
to protection against acts of anti-union discrimination; 
— to protection against refusal of employment, dismissal, or prejudice due 
to union membership or participation; and 
— government should promote processes for voluntary negotiations 
between employers and workers and their organisations. 
B. General principles 
1. Voluntary collective bargaining should be protected by law and should 
be practised. 
2. Anti-union discrimination by employers should be illegal. 
3. Speedy and effective processes should exist to review union/worker 
complaints of anti-union discrimination. 
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III. Forced labour 
A. Definition 
Forced labour should be prohibited and suppressed in all its forms. 
Although there are certain exceptions, forced labour refers to work or 
service exacted from any person under the menace of penalty and for 
which the person has not volunteered. "Menace of penalty" includes loss 
of rights or privileges as well as penal sanctions. 
B. General principles 
1. Forced labour should never be used for the following purposes: 
a) economic development; 
b) to enforce racial, social, national or religious discrimination; 
c) as political coercion or education, or punishment for holding or 
expressing political views opposed to the established political, 
social or economic system; 
d) for labour discipline; 
e) as a punishment for having participated in legal strikes. 
2. The following do not constitute "forced labour" as defined under the 
international standards: 
a) certain forms of prison labour, only when imposed following 
conviction for a crime in a court of law; 
b) national service obligations (compulsory military service and 
normal civic obligations); 
c) genuine emergency, limited to a "sudden, unforeseen happening, 
calling for instant countermeasures, such as war, calamity or 
threatened calamity such as earthquakes, floods, pestilence, etc." 
d) minor communal services, defined as services performed by 
community members in the direct interest of the community. 
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IV. Minimum age for employment 
A. Definition 
The minimum age standard aims at the effective abolition of child labour 
by raising the minimum age for employment to a level consistent with the 
fullest physical, mental, and social development of young people. 
B. General principles 
1. The minimum age for employment should be set no lower than 15, with 
an option for a lower minimum of 14 for developing countries with a 
level of economic development that makes the realisation of the higher 
standard impossible. Countries that set the minimum age at the lower 
level, however, should be trying to progressively change conditions so 
that they can meet the higher standard. 
Exceptions: light work is permissible for 13-15 year olds; 
minimum age of 18 for dangerous work; work in connection with 
education or training; participation in artistic performances. 
2. Minimum age legislation should cover all economic activity, not just 
employment under contract. 
3. Education should be provided for all children and should be 
compulsory. The minimum age for employment shall not be less than 
the age for completion for compulsory schooling. 
4. Minimum age legislation should have an effective enforcement system 
that includes an adequate number of inspectors and penalties that serve 
as effective deterrents. Penalties should include fines and/or 
imprisonment. 
V. Acceptable conditions of work 
A. Definition 
The standards for acceptable working conditions provide for the 
establishment and maintenance of systems, adapted to national conditions, 
that provide for minimum, working standards: wages that provide a 
decent living for workers and their families; working hours that do not 
exceed 48 hours per week, with a full 24-hour rest day; a specified annual 
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paid holiday; and minimum conditions for protection of the safety and 
health of workers. 
Basic principles 
1. Minimum wage principles 
a) There should be a national, statutory minimum wage. 
b) It should be set realistically, preferably as a result of an open, 
public, or tripartite process, with certain specified criteria. 
c) Wages should be protected, i.e. paid in money and workers should 
be able to choose where and how they spend their wages. 
2. Hours of work 
a) Working hours should not exceed 48 hours per week, with a full 
24-hour rest day. Workers should have a specified annual paid 
holiday. 
b) Overtime should be regulated, remunerated at a higher rate than for 
"normal" working hours, and prohibited from exceeding a certain 
number of hours in a given period. 
3. Safety and health principles 
a) Workers should have health and safety rights in the workplace, 
including a complaint process for hazardous conditions and the 
right to remove themselves from hazardous situations. 
b) The government should have health and safety standards as part of 
an open, public, or tripartite process. 
4. Enforcement principles 
a) There should be a legislatively mandated enforcement system for 
minimum wage, hours or work, and safety and health. 
b) Inspectors should have the right to enter the workplace, should have 
access to workers and their representatives, and have the right to 
issue citations for violations. 
c) Workers and unions should be protected against adverse action in 
filing complaints. 
d) Penalties for violations should not be limited to warnings, but 
should include fines and prison sentences. 
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